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BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
the provisions of § 78-2a-3(2) (i) of the Utah Code and Rules 3 and
4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Does

the

failure

of

the Appellant

to

properly

marshal the evidence which supports the decision of the trial court
in this matter preclude
requested?

this

court

from granting

Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P. 2d 818, 820

the

relief

(Utah App.

1992) .
2.

When the trial court applying legally appropriate
1

criteria, properly awarded custody of the minor children of the
parties to Mrs. Baldwin, did the court abuse its discretion?

This

decision is subject to the standard of review that:
"Trial courts are given broad discretion in making child
custody awards." Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P. 2d 922, 923 (Utah
App. 1992).
"The trial court's decision regarding
custody will not be upset 'absent (a showing of an abuse
of discretion or manifest injustice.'"
Id. (quoting
Mauahan v. Mauahan, 770 P.2d 156, 159 (Utah App. 1989).
"'We give great deference to the trial court's findings
of fact and do not overturn them unless they are clearly
erroneous.'" Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 467 (Utah App.
1989).
"'However, to ensure the court acted within its
broad discretion, the facts and reasons for the court's
decision must be set forth fully in appropriate findings
and conclusions. Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, at 923 924 (Utah App. 1992) . (Quoting Painter v. Painter, 752
P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1988)."

Tucker v. Tucker, 881 P.2d 948, 951 (Utah App. 1994).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE
1.

Section 30-3-10 Utah Code Annotated:

(1)
If a husband and wife having minor
children are separated, or their marriage is
declared void or dissolved, the court shall
make an order for the future care and custody
of
the
minor
children
as
it
considers
appropriate.
In determining custody, the
court shall consider the best interests of the
child and the past conduct and demonstrated
moral standards of each of the parties.
The
court may inquire of the children and take
into consideration the children's desires
regarding
the
future
custody,
but
the
expressed desires are not controlling and the
court may determine the children's custody
otherwise.
(2)
In awarding the custody, the court
shall consider, among other factors the court
finds relevant, which parent is most likely to
act in the best interests of the child,
including allowing the child frequent and
continuing
contact
with
the
noncustodial
parent as the court finds appropriate.

2

2.
Rule
Administration.

4-903

of

the

Utah

Code

of

Judicial

Intent:
To establish uniform
guidelines
preparation of custody evaluations.

for

the

district

and

Applicability:
This rule shall
juvenile courts.

apply

to

the

Statement of the Rule:
(1)
Custody
evaluations
performed
by persons with
the
minimum qualifications:

shall
be
following

(A) Social work evaluations shall be
performed by social workers licensed by the
state in which they practice.
(B) Psychological evaluations shall be
performed by psychologists licensed by the
state in which they practice.
(C) Psychiatric examinations shall be
performed by a licensed physician with a
specialty in psychiatry.
(2)
In divorce cases, one evaluator shall perform the
evaluation on both parties and shall submit a written
report to the court, unless one of the prospective
custodians resides outside of the jurisdiction of the
court. In those cases, two individual evaluators may be
appointed.
The evaluators must confer prior to the
commencement of the evaluation to establish appropriate
guidelines and criteria and shall submit only one joint
report to the Court.
(3) Evaluators must consider and respond to
each of the following factors:
(A) the child's preference;
(B) the benefit of keeping siblings
together;
(C) the relative strength of the
child's bond with one or both of the
prospective custodians;
(D)
the
general
interest
in

3

continuing
previously
determined
custody arrangements where the child
is happy and well adjusted;
(E)
factors
relating
to
the
prospective custodians' character or
status
or
their
capacity
or
willingness to function as parents,
including:
(i)

moral character and emotional
stability;
(ii)
duration and depth of desire for
custody;
(iii)
ability to provide personal rather than
surrogate care;
(iv)
significant impairment of ability to
function as a parent through drug
abuse,excessive drinking or other causes;
(v)
reasons for having relinquished custody in the
past;
(vi)
religious compatibility with the child;
(vii)
kinship,
including
in
extraordinary
circumstances stepparent status;
(viii)
financial condition; and
(ix)
evidence
of
abuse
of
the
subject
child, another child, or spouse; and
(F) any other factors deemed important by the
evaluator, the parties, or the court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Dr.

Andrew Baldwin (hereinafter referred to as "Andrew")

presents no challenge to the sufficiency of the findings of the
court to support the award of custody of the children to Mrs. Susan
Baldwin

(hereinafter referred to as "Susan").

findings themselves.

He challenges the

In his Brief he cites extensively

to the

record asserting evidence that supports his challenge to the trial
court's Findings, however he fails to marshall the evidence which
supported the Findings and rulings of the trial court.

In doing so

he fails to meet his burden in this Court to properly present his
appeal.

Crockett v. Crockett,83 6 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah App. 1992),

Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305, 1308 (Utah App. 1991).
4

The parties were married on the 18th day of September,
1987, in Las Vegas, Nevada (R.2, 79, 2432-33) . Three children were
born of the marriage: William, born May 23, 1988; Barbara, born
July 31, 1991; and Andy born June 29, 1992.
Susan was

the primary

caretaker

of

the

throughout the marriage of the parties.

(R. 2, 79, 2485).

three minor
(R. 1479).

children

She was the

exclusive caretaker of Will from his birth until Barbara's birth on
July 31, 1991.

(R. 1479).

Shortly after Barbara's birth when she

discovered she was pregnant for a third time, Susan insisted Andrew
begin providing some care for Will.

(R. 1479).

While Andrew

provided some physical care for Will in terms of playing with him
and taking him with him for various activities, he did not perform
any of the other child care duties, such as cooking, cleaning,
purchasing, clothing or food, performing household chores, taking
the children to medical appointments or other daily activities
involved in child care.

Susan provided all of these services for

all three children and Andrew at no time provided care for either
Barbara or Andrew.

(R. [Susan] 2491 - 95, 2496 - 2509, 2513 - 17,

2559 - 60, 2579-80, 2593-2600, 2864-66, 2867-68, 3103-07.

[Dr.

Stewart] 2361-63, 2593, 3103. [Andrew] 2952-56).
Shortly after each of the children was born, Andrew
departed leaving Susan and the infant to pursue other activities.
Susan felt abandoned and forced to cope with the problems of a new
child and, after Barbara's birth, with the other children above.
(R. 1480) . This occurred despite the fact that the children were
delivered by caesarean section and the date that this would be
5

performed, was known in advance.

(R. 1480) . Andrew put pursuit of

his own interests ahead of those of providing care for the children
or assisting the mother.

(R. [Dr. Stewart] 2317-18, 2361-63, 2412.

[Susan] 2496-2509, 2643-46, 2652-53, 2867-68. [Andrew] 2935-42,
3020-21, 3370.)
Susan is a nurse.
of her children.
the family.
divorce

was

She went back to work after the birth

She arranged her shifts so as to be available for

(R. 1480, 2486-87, 2491-95, 2864-66).
pending,

Andrew

frequently

changed

While the

visits

as

he

accepted work assignments around the country and while in court was
unable to identify a future work schedule.

He stated his work

schedule was unpredictable, and the court found his theoretical
ability to provide personal care was accordingly questionable.

(R.

[Dr. Stewart] 2264-65, 2359.

[Susan] 2504-09, 2577-79, 2593-2600,

2724-25, 2867-68, 2882-83.

[Andrew] 2952-56, 3029-30, 3346-51,

3370.)
The court, after argument on September 8, 1992 (R. 177)
awarded temporary custody of the children to Susan.
Andrew objected.

(R.213-215, 405-416).

The court affirmed the

Commissioner's Recommendation on November 24, 1992.
54) .

(R. 182-186).

(R. 436, 453-

A custody evaluation was then performed by Dr. Elizabeth

Stewart (Exhibit "l").

Dr. Stewart recommended custody be awarded

to Susan (Exhibit " 1 " ) .
At the time of the final pretrial of this matter on
October 6, 1993, the trial court asked counsel for Andrew if he
desired to have another custody evaluation performed.
6

Counsel for

Susan stated that he would agree to such a second opinion, provided
that Dr. Stewart would be again permitted to examine the parties
and the children, and update her recommendation.

Andrew declined

to have further evaluations requested that the matter go forward to
trial.

(R. 1097, 1263, 2213).
As part of performing her evaluation, Dr. Stewart had

each of

the parties

Inventory

("MMPI").

inconsistent

with

take a Minnesota Multiphasic

Personality

She found that Andrew's MMPI profile was

the

interview

that

she conducted with him.

Consequently, she determined that his MMPI profile should not be
used in evaluating him.

(R. 2303, 3087-89).

Andrew challenged

this determination through the testimony of Dr. Donald Strassberg.
However, Dr. Strassberg did not evaluate either Susan or Andrew (R.
3155).

Over the objection that he had inadequate foundation to do

so, Dr. Strassberg was allowed to testify about the tests (R. 3157)
and the court heard his opinion (R. 3161-63, 3165-79).

In cross-

examination, Dr. Strassberg admitted that the MMPI tests are not
perfect (R. 3180) and it is possible to manipulate them (R. 317475) .

He also testified that he has done custody evaluations and

could not base a custody recommendation on the tests alone (R.
3180) .

Finally, he declared that he, himself, had no basis for

giving an opinion regarding custody.

(R. 3180) .

Interestingly enough, Dr. Strassberg testified that he
may

have

evaluation

recommended
(R. 3184) .

to

the

father

that

he

If so, that was advice

followed.
7

obtain

another

that was not

During trial, the court found Andrew's actions, though he
was

both

a

lawyer

admitted

to practice

in

California

and

a

physician (R. 36) with experience in psychiatry (R. 36) required
admonitions to keep himself under control.

(R. 3287).

Andrew,

feeling that the court's findings in this regard were exaggerated,
fails to reveal to this court that the trial court held several
side bar conferences and both before and after recesses, advised
counsel for Andrew that Andrew needed to be under more control.
The side bar conferences were not recorded, but occurred (R. 23 64,
32 99) and an exchange between the court and Andrew, while he was
testifying, demonstrates some of the difficulty with which the
court was coping.

(R. 3363-64) . The observations of the court in

this regard, were similar to those of Dr. Stewart.

(R. 2260-61,

2269-72, 2276-77, 2288, 2293-96, 2318-19, 2321-23, 2324, 2342-45,
2378-79, 2382, 2409-11, 2416-17, 3094-99, 3102-03, 3131-36).
The court was advised by Dr. Stewart that she becomes
very concerned when finding that one parent attempts to alienate
the children from the other parent and she found evidence that
Andrew was attempting to alienate Will from Susan.

(R. 2261-63,

2265-68, 2277-82, 2321-23, 2324, 3098-99, 3102-03).
Andrew acted in ways that caused high stress to Susan and
children without apparently seeming to reflect on the damage that
he was inflicting.

The 911 tape was considered to be a compelling

example of this by the court.

(Exhibit 31.)

Andrew acknowledged that Susan had done a very good job
of parenting under difficult circumstances (R. 3371-72) and that
8

Susan had been flexible regarding visitation.

(R. 3022, 3375-36).

Dr. Stewart confirmed that this was her finding as well (R. 235152) .
It was Dr. Stewart's observation that while Andrew played
with the children, that was different from providing care and a
structure in which they would properly function.

She testified

that had he provided a structure with limits, such as Susan did, he
would have encountered more difficulty with the children.

(R.

2261-63, 2269-72, 2276-77, 2277-82, 2293-96, 2356-57, 2378-79,
2382, 3103-08) .
Until the time of trial, Andrew's position was that he
wanted custody of only the older child, Will, and that custody of
the younger two children, Barbara and Andy should be awarded to
Susan,

(R. 34, 43, 53, 58-59, 74, 117-18, 135-36, 146-49, 182-84,

221-22, 2172-73) .

Andrew testified on January 10, 1994 that in

reality he wanted Susan to raise all the children until they
started school and then have the children spend the school year
with him and the off time with her.

(R. 3213-14, 3343-44) .

Susan became concerned about Will's conduct and sought to
have

his

misconduct

hyperactive.

diagnosed.

It

was

found

that

he

was

Andrew refused to accept this diagnosis and expended

substantial efforts at trial trying to prove that Will's difficulty
was not hyperactivity.

Judge Lewis advised Andrew that she was not

going to make a determination as to Will's medical condition, the
issue was one of whether or not one or both of the parents were
unwilling

to comply with

the recommendations
9

of medical

care

providers.

(R. 2855).

In that context, the evidence demonstrated

that Andrew refused to accept the diagnosis.

(R. [Dr. Stewart]

2270-75, 2318-21, 2323, 3107-08/ [Dr. Goldsmith] 2435-47, 2462-64,
2468-75, 2477-79, 2481-82; [Susan] 2487-89, 2580-84; [Dr. Francis
Burger] 2895-2906; [Andrew] 3204-09) .
After hearing six (6) days of testimony, the trial court
ruled that custody of the three minor children of the parties, all
preschoolers, should be awarded to their mother, Susan.

(R. 1277-

1291) . The court accepted the testimony of the custody evaluator,
Dr. Elizabeth Stewart and found that Susan had been the primary
caregiver to the children throughout their lives and was more
emotionally stable and capable of providing a stable home for the
children than was Andrew.

(R. 1277-1291, 1478-95).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

AFTER CONSIDERING FACTORS REQUIRED BY § 30-310 OF THE UTAH CODE AND THE APPLICABLE UTAH
APPELLATE DECISIONS, JUDGE LEWIS AWARDED
CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILDREN OF THE PARTIES
TO SUSAN, A DECISION WHICH ANDREW HAS APPEALED
TO THIS COURT.
1.

Andrew fails to marshall the evidence supporting the

findings of the trial court and thus fails to properly present his
appeal

to this court. This failure precludes

granting the relief requested.

this court

from

Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P. 2d 818,

820 (Utah App. 1992); Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305, 1308
(Utah App. 1991).
2.
117

The Utah Supreme Court in Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d

(Utah 1987) ruled that in deciding custody the trial court
10

should examine function related factors and award custody based on
who has carried out the parenting function.

This court in Moon v.

Moon, 790 P.2d 52 (Utah App. 1990), and Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d
922

(Utah App. 1992) elaborated on the Pusey criteria and the

factors articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in Hutchison v.
Hutchison, 649 P. 2d 38 (Utah 1982) as the other criteria which
should

be

considered.

In an attempt

to

focus

the

custody

evaluators to consider these critical custody factors, the Utah
Judicial Council published Rule 4-903 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration to guide custody evaluators. Dr. Stewart framed her
report on the factors articulated in Rule 4-903 and her written
report was accepted by the court as Exhibit "1". The trial court
appropriately considered all of these factors and acted within its
discretion when it awarded custody to Susan.
ARGUMENT
I.

This

ANDREW FAILS TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE IN
PRESENTING HIS APPEAL TO THE COURT AND HIS
APPEAL SHOULD BE REJECTED.
court

has

articulated

the

following

test

appellants challenging factual findings of a trial court:
In challenging Findings, the Appellant:
must marshall all evidence in favor
of the facts as found by the trial
court and then demonstrate that even
reviewing the evidence in a light
most favorable to the court below,
the evidence is insufficient to
support the findings of fact. If
the Appellant fails to marshall the
evidence,
the
appellate
court
assumes the record supports the
findings of the trial court and
proceeds to review the accuracy of

for

the lower court's conclusions of law
and the application of that law in
the case.
Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199
1991) (citations omitted).

(Utah

Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d at 1308.
Examination of Andrew's brief demonstrates that each of
the findings from Finding 5 through 25 is examined.
are challenged.

A citation to the record is purportedly made as to

that evidence Andrew believes supports the ruling.
discussed.

All but two

It is not

No effort is made to show why that evidence is legally

insufficient to support the ultimate finding. Andrew simply states
where he feels a challenge exists.

He makes no effort to marshall

and present the evidence that supported the court's finding.
The marshalling rule was adopted so that there would be
an understanding by both the appellant and the Appellate Court as
to what evidence exists in support of a ruling by the court.

This

is required so that the Appellate Court is not put in the position
of

simply

witnesses.

retrying

the

case

without

seeing

or

hearing

the

As the Utah Supreme Court stated in a similar case,

Nilson v. Nilson. 652 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1982):
... this court is reluctant to reconsider evidence that
a trial court is in an advantaged position to weigh. Our
removal from the participants in a trial puts us in the
disadvantaged position of reviewing testimony from a cold
record. On review, we cannot judge the intonation of
voice, or the manner and demeanor of witnesses as the
trial judge is able to do.

12

652 P.2d at 1324-1324.x

Andrew has simply attempted to retry and

re-argue the matter to this court.

Rather than marshalling the

evidence that supported the trial court's conclusion, he has downplayed it or made it difficult to find.

By arguing the evidence

that was not accepted by the trial court, he asks this Court to
reject the findings of the trial court without marshalling the
evidence which supports those findings.

He only marshals that

evidence which is contrary to the challenged findings.
procedure

which

inappropriate.

this

court

has

unequivocally

This is a
ruled

is

In doing so, he has failed to properly present his

appeal and this Court should "assume[] that the record supports the
findings of the trial court..."

Procon Corp. v. Utah Dept. of

Transportation, 876 P.2d 890, 894 (Utah App. 1994).
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION BY
AWARDING CUSTODY TO SUSAN CORRECTLY APPLYING
THE GOVERNING LEGAL CRITERIA.
If this Court overlooks the procedural defect of Andrew's

failure to properly marshal the facts in support of the trial
court's findings, there was ample evidence presented during trial
which demonstrates the propriety of that decision.
Recognizing

that

custody

1

is

a

painful,

difficult

See also Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 495
(Utah App. 1994):
Callahan does not properly attack the findings of the
trial court on that issue.
He attempts to draw our
attention to the testimony of witnesses, which tends to
be contrary to the findings, and he conveniently ignores
the testimony of witnesses that support the findings.
Callahan ignores his affirmative duty to properly attack
the findings by marshalling the evidence. Because of
Callahan's failure to marshal the evidence, we assume the
record supports the findings of the trial court.
13

decision, Utah appellate courts have articulated a cognizable,
basis on which custody decisions should be made.

This commenced

with the decision of Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986) in
which the Utah Supreme Court ruled that there was to be no gender
bias

in

custody

determinations,

and

then

declared

the

basic

governing rule for deciding custody cases in Utah.
We believe that the choice in competing child
custody claims should instead be based on
function-related factors.
Prominent among
these, though not exclusive, is the identity
of the primary caretaker during the marriage.
Other factors should include the identity of
the parent with greater flexibility to provide
personal care for the child, and the identity
of the parent with whom the child has spent
most of his or her time, pending the custody
determination,
if that period has been
lengthy. Another important factor should be
the stability of the environment provided by
each parent.
Id. at

120.

In the

instant

matter

the

trial

court

entered

extensive findings, numbers 5-25 of which demonstrate a careful
examination of each of these factors.

(R. 1478-95) . They reveal

that the trial court carefully considered the criteria articulated
by the Supreme Court and this Court is reaching an appropriate
decision to award custody to Susan.
After

the

Pusey decision, this

Court

has taken

two

opportunities to provide further guidance to counsel and trial
courts as to the appropriate criteria that should be applied in
custody decisions.

In Moon v. Moon, 790 P.2d 52 (Utah App. 1990),

this Court, interpreting and applying § 30-3-10 of the Utah Code
stated:
...Case

law

has

fleshed
14

out

the

'best

interest' criterion to include the following
factors:
The
need
for
stability
in
custodial
relationship and environment; maintaining an
existing primary custodial bond; the relative
strength of parental bonds; the relative
abilities of the parents to provide care,
supervision, and a suitable environment for
the children and to meet the needs of the
children; preference of a child able to
evaluate the custody question; the benefits of
keeping siblings together, enabling sibling
bonds to form; the character and emotional
stability of the custodian; and the desire for
custody; the apparent commitment of the
proposed custodian to parenting.
These factors are highly personal and
individual, and do not lend themselves to the
means of generalization employed in other
areas of the law, such as quantification in
money.
Id. at 54.

The Court noted in a footnote to this quote that the

list is not exhaustive and in making it the Court did not prescribe
consideration of any of the enumerated set of concepts.
In Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922 (Utah App. 1992) this
Court declared:
[4]
There is no definitive checklist of
factors to be used for determining custody
since such 'factors are highly personal and
individual, and do not lend themselves to the
means of generalization employed in other
areas of the law....' Moon v. Moon, 790- P.2d
52, 54 (Utah App. 1990).
The trial court
must,
however,
make
adequate
findings
regarding the 'best interests of the child and
the past conduct and demonstrated moral
standards of each of the parties.' Utah Code
Ann. § 30-3-10 (1) (1989) . The court must also
consider
best
interests
of
the
child,
including allowing the child frequent and
continuing contact with the noncustodial
parent as the § 30-3-10(2) (1989) . In order to
determine the best interests of the child the
court
should
also
consider
and,
where
15

applicable, make appropriate findings on the
following factors:
[T] he preference of the child;
keeping
siblings
together;
the
relative strength of the child's
bond with one or both of the
prospective custodians; and, in
appropriate
cases,
the
general
interest in continuing previously
determined
custody
arrangements
where the child is happy and well
adjusted.
In a prior decision, the Supreme Court in Hutchison v.
Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982) stated the courts should also
consider, where applicable, the following factors relating to the
prospective custodians:
[M]oral
character
and
emotional
stability; duration and depth of desire for
custody; ability to provide personal rather
than surrogate care; significant impairment of
ability to function as a parent through drug
abuse, excessive drinking, or other cause;
reasons for having relinquished custody in the
past; religious compatibility with the child;
kinship,
including,
in
extraordinary
circumstances,
stepparent
status;
and
financial condition.
649 P.2d at 41.
In an effort to provide information to the court that
will demonstrate examination and evaluation of these factors, the
Judicial Council published Rule 4-903 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration to serve as a guideline to custody evaluators as to
how their evaluations are to be conducted and presented to the
trial court.

Examination of Exhibit 1 reveals that Dr. Stewart

followed the criteria articulated by Rule 4-903 in presenting her
findings and recommendations to the court.
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All

of

the

criteria

considered by Dr. Stewart.

of

Rule

4-903

were

correctly

Findings 5 through 25 demonstrate the

trial court's determinations followed the statutory and appellate
court directives.

Each factor on which evidence was available was

examined and an appropriate finding was made.

(R. 1478-1495).

These findings have been challenged by Andrew but he fails to
marshall
findings.

fully

the

testimony

Despite Andrew's

which

supported

each

of

failure, Susan will marshal

evidence as well as respond to the challenges presented.

these
that

A review

of the evidence and law demonstrates that the trial court acted
properly in this case.
Finding of Fact No. 5 provides:
Susan Baldwin has been the primary caretaker of the three
minor children throughout the marriage of the parties. She
was the exclusive caretaker of Will from his birth until
Barbara's birth on July 31, 1991. Shortly after Barbara's
birth when the Plaintiff discovered she was pregnant for a
third time, Defendant, at Plaintiff's insistence began
providing some care for Will. While the Defendant provided
physical care for Will in terms of playing with him and taking
him with him for various activities, he did not perform any
other child care duties, such as cooking, cleaning, purchasing
clothing or food, household chores, taking the children to
medical appointments or other daily activities involved in
child care. The Plaintiff provided all of these services for
all three children. The Defendant at no time provided care
for either Barbara or Andrew.
This Finding was supported by the testimony of Susan Baldwin, (R.
2491-95, 2496-2509, 2513-17, 2559-60, 2579-80, 2593-2600, 2864-66,
2867-68, 3103-07); Dr. Elizabeth Stewart, (R. 2361-63, 2593, 3103);
and Andrew Baldwin

(R. 2952-56) .

While Andrew states that the

evidence was conflicting, he fails to set forth any basis on which
the trial court abused its discretion in choosing to accept the
17

testimony of Susan, Dr. Stewart, and himself in support of this
finding vis-a-vis the evidence which is generally alleged but not
articulated which is contrary to this Finding.

The Utah Supreme

Court has made it clear that it is "the prerogative of the court to
choose which testimony it would believe." Sweeney v. Happy Valley,
Inc., 417 P.2d 126, 130 (Utah 1966) . Andrew's challenge on appeal
ignores the trial court's decision to believe testimony contrary to
his position.
In
demonstrate

addition,
that

he

examination

did

not

cite

of
to

Andrew's
the

supporting the finding of the trial court.
with Andrew's cites).

Court

record
all

cites

evidence

(Compare Susan's cites

In making this challenge, Andrew fails to

deal with the fact that the trial court hears conflicting evidence
and must

determine which is credible and should be

accepted.

Yelderman v. Yelderman, 669 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1983), Nilson v.
Nilson, 652 P.2d 1323, 1324-25 (Utah 1982).

In his challenge to

this finding and each of those hereinafter discussed, he makes this
same failure. Abuse of discretion is not demonstrated by believing
one witness instead of another.
Finding number 6 was not disputed.

It is supported by

the testimony of both Dr. Stewart (R. 22 93-96) and Andrew (R. 2 95861) .
Finding number 7:
After each of the children was born, Will in 1988,
Barbara in 1991, Andrew in June of 1992, the Defendant
left town leaving the Plaintiff to cope by herself with
the problems of a new child, and after Barbara's birth,
with children who were already residing in the home.
This occurred despite the fact that the date of each
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child's birth was known in advance. The Defendant put
pursuit of his own interests ahead of those of providing
care for the children (William, or William and Barbara)
when Barbara and Andrew were born.
This Finding is supported by the testimony of Dr. Stewart (R. 231718, 2361-63, 2367, 2412, 2414-15), Susan (R. 2496-2509, 2643-46,
2652-53, 2867-68), and Andrew (R. 2935-42, 3020-31, 3370).

The

only apparent challenge to this finding is the declaration that
there is nothing to support the finding that Susan was left to cope
with a new born child by herself.

No dispute is made of the fact

that the evidence was clear that Andrew left town after the birth
of each of the three children. Susan, after undergoing a caesarean
delivery, had to deal with a new baby and then with a new baby and
other children.

The issue not discussed is whether because there

were other people present to help Susan, should she not have felt
abandoned by Andrew. The evidence is undisputed that he left Susan
shortly after each child was born and she felt abandoned when he
did this.

There simply can be no credible challenge to this

Finding.
Finding number 8 is supported not only by the record
references cited by Andrew, but additionally by Susan's testimony
(R. 2491-95, 2557-60, 2864-66).

No contrary evidence is cited.

Finding number 9 is not disputed.

It is supported by

Susan's testimony (R. 2486-87, 2491-95, 2864-66).
Finding number 10, which is challenged in part by Andrew
provides:
Defendant has never provided personal care for
Barbara and Andrew for longer than a weekend which
occurred during the pendency of this matter.
In
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addition, Defendant has, during the pendency of this
matter, frequently charged his visits as he accepted work
assignments around the country.
He was unable to
identify a future work schedule in court. He stated it
would be unpredictable.
Consequently, Defendant's
theoretical ability to provide personal care is
questionable.
This Finding is supported by Exhibit "1", and the testimony of Dr.
Stewart (R. 2264-65, 2359), Susan (R. 2504-09, 2577-79, 2593-2600,
2724-25, 2867-68, 2882-83), and Andrew (R. 2952-56-3029-30, 334651, 3370) .
Andrew tries to explain, and in part dispute, Finding
number 11:
The Defendant has never provided personal care for
Barbara or Andrew while the Plaintiff has regularly
scheduled her shifts to provide custodial care for
all three children. During the pendency of the matter
the Defendant would not accept regularly scheduled
visitation because he declared his work prohibited him
from doing so. His uncertain and irregular schedule with
unpredictable times in which to provide personal care is
a pattern that continued throughout the pendency of this
action. In addition, the Plaintiff testified that when
he had personal time free during the course of
the marriage, while the parties resided together,
Defendant frequently used this for research and writing
rather than providing care for the children.
The
Defendant did not dispute this testimony regarding his
use of his time.
However, he does not fully articulate and recite the basis upon
which it is supported.

It is supported by Exhibit

"1", the

testimony of Dr. Stewart (R. 2264-65), Susan (R. 2491-95, 2504-09,
2552-54 (Exhibit "14"), 2556-60, 2577-79, 2593-2600, 2724-25, 286466, 2867-68), and Andrew (R. 2952-56, 3346-52, 3370).
Andrew then examines the essence of Findings 5-11 and
concedes that they constitute findings which support a conclusion
by the court that Susan was the primary caretaker of the children.
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Andrew declares that the evidence was conflicting on this point.
If the evidence is truly conflicting, then the trial court rejected
his evidence and accepted that presented by Susan.

This is the

function of the trial court. Yelderman v. Yelderman, supra, Nilson
v. Nilson, supra.; Sweeny, supra..
If the evidence is conflicting, Andrew must show some
abuse by the court in making this determination.

The citations to

the record presented by Susan in this Brief show that they are
rationally based on the evidence presented.

That is precisely

what the trial court is to do. Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P. 2d at 924,
Martinez v. Martinez, 728 P.2d

994,

(Utah 1986) . No abuse of

discretion is demonstrated by the trial court's accepting the
evidence which supports its finding, and rejecting the evidence
which does not.
supra.

Yelderman v. Yelderman, supra, Nilson v. Nilson,

Apparently, Andrew believes that anything he said or

presented had to be believed, while that offered by Susan had to be
rejected if they conflicted.

That is not the rule by which either

this Court or the trial court functions.

Yelderman v. Yelderman,

supra,

trial

Nilson v.

Nilson,

supra.

The

court

rationally based findings from the evidence presented.

must

make

The record

references recited in support of each of the challenged portions of
every finding, reflect the trial court properly carried out this
function. Andrew fails to recognize that simply because he offered
evidence which is not accepted, does not mean the trial court has
abused its discretion in not accepting or finding credible his
evidence as opposed to Susan's evidence. As the Utah Supreme Court
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stated in Yelderman v. Yelderman, supra:
The weight
and credibility of the
witness, including expert testimony . . . are
matters to be determined by the trier of fact.
669 P.2d at 408.
Finding 12 provides:
In determining the stability of the environment provided
by each parent, the Plaintiff is clearly capable of supplying
a much more stable environment than is the Defendant. Dr.
Elizabeth Stewart, the only mental health professional who
examined both the parties and their children on behalf of the
court, was clear and unequivocal in testifying that it was the
Plaintiff who could provide a stable, emotional environment
for the children, not the Defendant.
The behavior of the
parties in the court during the trial confirmed the
information provided by Dr. Stewart. The Plaintiff remained
calm and provided information for the court. The Defendant
became highly agitated and had difficulty keeping himself
under control. On occasion the court had to admonish him or
request the assistance of his counsel in keeping the Defendant
under control so that the proceedings could continue. The
Plaintiff presented non-accusatory information to the court
about the experiences and parenting of the parties.
The
Defendant was accusatory and attacked the Defendant.
In
addition, the psychological testing of the parties, as
described by the mental health professionals, as well as the
clinical observations by Dr. Stewart indicated that while
people and relationships are important to the Plaintiff,
impersonal ideas are important to the Defendant. The children
must be raised in an environment where they and their
relationships to their parents, their peers, their families
and each other are important. The Plaintiff is the parent who
can create an environment in which these will be emphasized,
maintained and taught. These are extremely important in the
emotional stability of the environment maintained for the
children.
A custodial parent must provide comfort and
security for a child and by personal care and using friends in
a social environment, the Plaintiff has given the children an
environment of adult caring. The Defendant did not provide
such an environment and is unable to do so.
This Finding is upheld by substantially more evidence than is
acknowledged by Andrew.

It is supported not only by Exhibit "1",

but by the testimony of Dr. Stewart (R. 2260-61, 2269-72, 2276-77,
2288, 2293-96, 2318-19, 2321-23, 2324, 2342-45, 2378-79, 2382,
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2409-11, 2416-17, 3094-99, 3102-03, 3131-36), by the admonition of
Andrew by the court during court (R. 3287) by the exchange between
the

court

and

Andrew

(R. 3363-64)

conferences (R. 2364, 3299).
in the

and

by

the

two

side

bar

Andrew fails to admit that not only

side bar conferences

(off the record) but on

several

occasions at recesses or at the conclusion of a session when
counsel approached the bench (off the record), the court advised
counsel for Andrew that his behavior was inappropriate and needed
to be controlled.

It was only on the last day of trial that Judge

Lewis was so exasperated by Andrew's conduct that she made the on
the record admonition (R. 3287).
In addition, this finding is supported by the testimony
of

Dr.

Goldsmith

(R.

2444-46-2461,

2470-73),

Susan

and

interestingly enough, Andrew who admitted he had told Dr. Stewart,
that

Susan had done a good

job of parenting under

difficult

circumstances (R. 3371-72).
In the course of the challenge to this Finding, Andrew
asserts that the report by Dr. Stewart is stale.

He does not

acknowledge that at the final pretrial conference on October 6,
1993, a few days before the trial started he was offered the
opportunity to have another evaluation done, and/or an update by
Dr.

Stewart

completed.

An opportunity

he

rejected.

Andrew

determined to go forward with the trial without the offered second
opinion or update by Dr. Stewart.

In addition, Dr. Strassberg

testified that he may have recommended to the Andrew that he seek
another

evaluation.

(R.

3184)
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and

if

so,

that

was

advice

deliberately rejected by Andrew who now seeks to challenge Dr.
Stewart's report on the basis of staleness. Andrew, having waived
an updated evaluation now attempts to use his waiver as a basis for
an attack on the evidence.
Andrew also challenges Dr. Stewart's reliance on the
Rotter Sentence Completion Test but offered no evidence as to why
she should not have done so. The results of these tests were
admitted before the court as Exhibits 41 and 42.

The testimony of

Dr. Stewart explained the use of these tests and why they supported
the findings she made.

(R. 3089 - 3091) .

Dr. Susan Mirrow, an

expert witness offered by Andrew, testified that use of the Rotter
Sentence Completion Test was the type of projective tests she
thought should be utilized.

(R. 2787, 2790) .

Andrew asserts the court's adoption of Dr. Stewart's
conclusion "reflects a conscious disregard of the evidence flatly
contradicting her assessment."

(Appellant's Brief page 21.)

He

fails to understand that if the trial court finds in the exercise
of its discretion that this is credible evidence, it should be
accepted and adopted.

Sweeney, supra..

The fact that Andrew

offered conflicting evidence, does not mean the court has to accept
his

evidence

as opposed

to contrary

evidence.

Yelderman

v.

Yelderman, supra, Nilson v. Nilson, supra.
Andrew challenges the court's decisions regarding the
MMPI evidence. Dr. Stewart, in fact, did make use of the MMPI test
results, but not in a way that Andrew accepts.
assertions must be accepted.

He believes his

The trial court's function is to
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determine

what

discretion.

is correct

in an appropriate

exercise

of

its

Simply rejecting the father's evidence and accepting

the mother's does not make it wrong.
supra, Nilson v. Nilson, supra.

Ye1derman v. Ye1derman,

Dr. Stewart testified that

Andrew's MMPI profile was inconsistent with his interview.

She

either had to assume the interview information and observations
which she made in person were incorrect or the test was incorrect.
It was her decision that the test was in error.

She believed that

Andrew had taken the test with the intention of down playing some
of the significant items in it and she utilized that as one of the
factors on which she formulated her ultimate opinions.

(R. 2303,

3087-3089) . Dr. Stewart recognized that Andrew had taken this test
before (R. 2308, 3240) . Dr. Stewart explained her use of an MMPI
in a custody case, (R. 3099-3101).

She testified it is not to be

used by itself. Thus, the challenge presented by Dr. Strassberg to
her interpretation was misplaced.
This is underscored by the fact that Dr. Strassberg did
not actually interview or see either Susan or Andrew (R. 3155) and
he was

allowed

to

testify

about

the

test profiles

over

the

objection that he lacked foundation because he had not seen either
of the people (R. 3155-59, 3164).

The court did hear his opinion

over the same objection (R. 3161-63, 3165-79) . The court noted, as
Andrew has not, that the objection raised issues of weight and
credibility,

not

admissability.

On

cross-examination,

Dr.

Strassberg testified that the tests can miss (R. 3180) and he would
not base a custody recommendation on the tests alone (R. 3180) . He
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declared that he had no basis for giving a custody opinion based on
the tests.

(R. 3180) .

He did admit that it is possible, though

difficult, to manipulate MMPI tests.
conflicting

evidence

the court

(R. 3174-75) .

On this

found against Andrew, properly

fulfilling the duty doing what it was directed to do by the Supreme
Court, Yelderman v. Yelderman, supra, Nilson v. Nilson, supra.

No

abuse of discretion or error in judgment is demonstrated by Andrew.
In sum, no evidence was given that Dr. Stewart made any
error in rejecting an MMPI test that was inconsistent with the
clinical observations that she had made.

In addition, she found

that Andrew said he was depressed (R. 3112-3118) and that this did
not show up on his MMPI profile.
One of the unspoken critical issues at this point becomes
Andrew's credibility.

Could he or did he manipulate these results?

In considering this question and the validity of Dr. Stewart's
action, the trial court appropriately considered Andrew's testimony
and demeanor.

He is an attorney.

He was present at the hearing

held in regard to the Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show
Cause in September of 1992.

He knew that he had been ordered not

to dissipate assets, yet he dissipated $94,500.00 worth of assets
during the pendency of the action.

(R. 3368-69).

He testified

that even though he was aware of the Order, he utilized the funds.
(R. 3368-69) .
entered

If he was so willing to ignore an order of court

in his presence,

the

court, like Dr. Stewart,

could

appropriately find he would manipulate test results in a test with
which he was familiar.
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Andrew takes the position before this Court, that the
trial

court

was

required

to believe

that

Susan, rather

than

himself, based solely on her MMPI profile, would be manipulative.
However, that is, directly contrary to the evidence presented, that
is the actions of the parties as described and evaluated in the
findings.

Dr. Stewart explained that the mother's profile was

valid and useable (R. 2311).
observations.

It was consistent with her clinical

(R. 2316) . She testified that Andrew was insisting

on an absolute reading of the mother's profile, but that was not
the proper way to read it; it had to be read based on the moderator
variables, that is what had actually happened in the mother's life.
(R. 2312-14, 2392-2406) . She also observed that the mother was not
a person who would think carefully about maximizing her position.
(R. 2340) .
Dr.

Stewart

felt

it

was

appropriate

to

use

the

information from the MMPI in context, not as an absolute. She felt
it was

necessary

that

it be evaluated

consistently

with her

experience in a custody case context as opposed to a clinical
setting.

Andrew asserts the court's acceptance of this evidence

is an abuse of discretion.

It is not.

This is a situation where

his version of the evidence was not accepted - Susan's was.
is not an abuse of discretion.

That

That is the trial court carrying

out its function of fact finding.

As the Utah Supreme Court has

held, " [w] hen there is a discrepancy in testimony rendered by the
witnesses, the fact finder must decide which account is the most
accurate."

Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 530, 531 (Utah 1979).
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See

also Homer v. Smith, 866 P.2d 622, 626

(Utah App. 1993) ("When

acting as the fact-finder, the trial court is entitled to assess
the witnesses

and

to weigh

inferences therefrom").

the

evidence

and

draw

reasonable

Yelderman v. Yelderman, supra, Nilson v.

Nilson, supra.
Andrew asserted and tried to establish that Susan was
having trouble in handling Will.
point.

The evidence conflicted on this

Dr. Stewart testified that Will's conduct of becoming

anxious before returning to his mother, was a very normal behavior
which is consistently seen in a divorce where children are passing
from one parent to the other.

(R. 3118-19) . In rejecting Andrew's

assertions and testimony, the court was appropriately fact finding,
not abusing in its discretion.
Finally, a challenge is made to Dr. Stewart's ex-parte
communication with Plaintiff's counsel.
candidly presented to the Court.

The challenge

is not

Dr. Stewart testified that she

talked to both counsel for Susan and counsel for Andrew (R. 224445).

She related that attorneys regularly provide information to

her this way in custody cases.

(R. 2246-47) She testified it is

not unusual for counsel to contact her and such contacts do not
influence her, they simply provide her with more information and
the more information she can receive, the better she can evaluate
the information that she has.

(R. 2253).

She further explained

this by advising the trial court that she did not see herself as an
expert

for one side or the other, she will work with either

counsel.

She is an expert who provides information to the trial
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court as she sees it.

(R. 3130-31).

Andrew claims Finding 13, which provides:
While Defendant clearly loves all the
children and has a great deal to offer these
children, the court finds that he is not
equally bonded to the three children.
Dr.
Stewart clearly opined the Plaintiff would
make the better custodial parent for the three
children and is strongly and equally bonded to
all three. The Court finds this testimony to
be credible.
is not supported by any evidence.

This Finding is supported by

Exhibit "1" and the testimony of Dr. Stewart.

(R.2376-79, 2382,

3121-23).
Finding 14, which is challenged by Andrew provides:
The court was advised by Dr. Stewart that
she is very concerned when one parent
alienates children from the other parent. She
found, and the court has determined from the
testimony of the parties and their conduct in
court that Dr. Stewart correctly observed that
the Defendant works to alienate the children
from the Plaintiff by fault finding, criticism
and derogatory comments. On the other hand,
the Plaintiff does not engage in this
behavior.
This Finding is supported by Susan's testimony (R. 2870) and Dr.
Stewart's testimony (Exhibit "1", 2261-63-2265-68, 2277-82, 232123, 2324, 3098-99, 3102-03).

Andrew again challenges this finding

but fails to cite to the evidence which supports it and presents
only

his

criticism

without

first

examining

all

the

presented.
Finding 15 which provides:
The Court found the defendant's testimony
concerning the Park City outing to be
particularly significant in this context.
When defendant, en route to Park City,
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evidence

experienced problems with his vehicle, he
walks in distance in the sun/heat with the
children, decided to keep the children with
him overnight and chose not to call the
plaintiff directly to seek assistance with the
children, or to advise her of where he and the
children were and what his plans were.
is supported by Andrew's testimony

(R. 3033-44, 3383-84).

No

attempt is made to marshall or analyze the evidence supporting this
finding.
Finding 16 which provides:
The 911 tape was considered compelling by
the Court. The content and the tone of the
tape
reflected
an
alarming
degree
of
persistence, angry demands, intense poundings
on the doors, and chaos, at the home, to which
the children were insensitively subjected.
While both parents might well have handled
this situation differently, keeping the best
interest of the children at the forefront of
their minds, it is particularly clear that the
defendant lost control and forgot what was
best for the children.
is supported by Exhibit 31. There is, in addition, testimony about
what occurred by Dr. Stewart
2832-36) .

(R. 226567) and Susan (R. 2526-27,

There is also the discussion of this tape between the

trial court and counsel on the record (R. 2823-2825, 2826-27, 290608, Exhibit "31").

Andrew's testimony conveyed his explanation.

It also demonstrated that he did not consider the impact of what he
was doing on either Susan or children.
his brief

(P. 34-35)

underlines

The position expressed in

the validity

of

the

determination.
Finding 17, which provides:
Defendant acknowledged, while on the stand,
that the plaintiff has been flexible regarding
visitation in the past.
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court's

is supported not only by Andrew's testimony (R. 3022, 3375-76), but
also by Dr. Stewart (R. 2351-52).
Finding 18 which provides:
Dr. Stewart described the difference
between playing with and entertaining the
children as opposed to providing every day
structure and care. She testified that the
structure a care giver would give would
produce more resistance from a child than
would simply playing with the child, yet this
care giver providing structure would be
providing more attention to the children than
someone who simply played with the children.
The Plaintiff is aware of the problems that
arise from her providing structure for the
children. The Defendant, not providing this
type of structure, does not encounter this
type of difficulty.
The Plaintiff provides
limits for the children and this produces
conflicts. The Defendant does not. Instead
of recognizing that this is a problem, the
Defendant simply criticizes the Plaintiff to
the children, which is a de-stabilizing factor
in their lives. The lack of this criticism in
the home of Mrs. Baldwin is one of the
stabilizing factors in the children's lives as
it leaves them free to form an unfettered
relationship with their father. Dr. Baldwin
does not permit the children this freedom in
their relationship with Mrs. Baldwin.
This
conduct by Dr. Baldwin is detrimental to the
children.
is supported by the testimony of Dr. Stewart (R. 2261-63, 2269-72,
2276-77, 2277-82, 2293-96, 2356-57, 2378-79, 2382, 3103-08), Susan

(R. 2516, 2531, 2870),

and Andrew

(R. 3195-98).

evidence supporting this Finding is not marshalled.

Again, the
Andrew simply

recites his contrary evidence, primarily his testimony and fails to
demonstrate any abuse of discretion by the trial court in rejecting
the evidence offered by him while accepting the evidence presented
by Susan.
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Finding 19 provides:
Will
is strongly bonded with both
parents.
Andrew and Barbara have strong
bonding with the Plaintiff and weak bonding
with the Defendant.
The Defendant has not
demonstrated an ability to provide care and
supervision in a suitable environment for the
children and meet their needs for a prolonged
period
of
time.
The
Plaintiff
has
demonstrated an ability to provide care and
supervision in a suitable environment for the
children and meet their needs throughout their
lives.
it is supported by the testimony of both Dr. Stewart (R. 2268-72,
2342-44, 3121-23) and Susan (R. 2882-83).

Disingenuously, Andrew

in footnote 24, states that Dr. Stewart admitted she was not at
that moment able to make a finding or observation, based on the
long interval between her evaluation and the trial.

However, no

evidence to the contrary is offered by a conflicting professional
opinion though Andrew was offered the opportunity of a second
opinion and an update by Dr. Stewart.

An opportunity he rejected.

Finding 2 0 which provides:
The Defendant attempted to involve Will
in the custodial dispute. He has advised Will
that he
(Will) will be placed in the
Defendant's custody, thus trying to impact
Will's preference for which parent he would
reside. The Plaintiff has engaged in no such
activity. This activity is considered to be
seriously detrimental to Will.
is supported by the testimony of Dr. Stewart, (R. 2261-63-,2268,
2277-82, 2321-23, 3109-10), Susan (R. 2560-76, 2827-30), and Andrew
(R. 3028-29) . What Andrew fails to acknowledge is that the state
of the mind of the child, can establish that the child feels he is
being placed in the middle of a custodial dispute.
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However, that

is not the only evidence in support of this finding.

There is the

testimony of Dr. Stewart, as well as the testimony of Andrew
himself, as cited above.
Finding 21 provides:
The law favors keeping siblings together.
The Defendant initially wanted custody of Will
but not Barbara or Andy. His position changed
only as he went into trial, apparently after
determining that he would not be able to
successfully secure a separation of the
children. These three children should be kept
together in a family unit. The Plaintiff has
sought
custody
of
all
three
children
throughout this action and has constantly
maintained the position that the children
should be kept together in a family unit.
This is supported by pleadings submitted by Andrew (R. 34, 43, 53,
58-59, 74, 117-18, 135-36, 146-49, 182-84, 221-22, 2172-173), as
well as testimony of Dr. Stewart (R. 2281-82, 2354-59) and Exhibit
"1".

Interestingly enough, Andrew himself testified in trial that

this finding is true, though he does not acknowledge the impact of
this testimony.

In the hearing on January

10, 1994, Andrew

testified that in reality, he wanted Susan to raise Barbara and
Andy until they reach school age and then he would assume physical
custody for the school year. He would do the same for Will as soon
as Will was ready to start school.

(R. 3213-14, 3343-44) . This,

in fact, separates the children, as they are not triplets and will
not all reach school age at the same time.
this

is true, his own pleadings

and

While he denies that

testimony

establish

validity of the court's determination.
Finding 22 is challenged by Andrew.

It is:

Dr. Stewart advised the court that she
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the

found the character and emotional stability of
Susan Baldwin as a custodial parent, greatly
exceeded that of Andrew Baldwin. No credible
contrary evidence was presented to the court.
The court finds that Susan Baldwin has, in
terms of her character and her emotional
stability for providing custodial care for the
children, emotional stability and an ability
to provide an emotionally stable environment
which greatly exceeds that of the Defendant.
The evidence which supports this, is not only Exhibit "1", but the
testimony of Dr. Stewart in several places not cited by Andrew in
his challenge to this finding.

(R. 2261-63, 2268-72, 2276-77,

2293-96, 2342-44, Exhibit "1", 3131-36).
this Court must overturn the finding
contrary evidence.

Again, Andrew believes
simply because there is

There is no effort to marshall the evidence in

support of the court's finding, just a challenge to it.
Finding 23, provides:
The Plaintiff has demonstrated throughout
the lives of the children a major commitment
to custodial parenting.
The Defendant has
engaged in a playmate role with his son Will
but not even that with the other children.
While the Plaintiff returned to work on a part
time basis after the birth of the children,
the Defendant worked full time and utilized
his spare time to conduct research for the
publication of articles rather than assisting
with the children. In addition, the Defendant
was, until trial, perfectly willing, and in
fact, requested the court to separate the
children.
The desire and commitment for
custody is clearly differentiated between the
parties. The Plaintiff has sought custody of
all the children throughout these pleadings,
while the Defendant does not.
In fact he
advised the court in his January 10, 1994
testimony that he in reality wanted the
Plaintiff to raise Barbara and Andy until they
reached school age and then he would assume
physical custody.
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It is supported by the pleadings (R. 34, 43, 53, 58-59, 74, 117-18,
135-36, 146-49, 182-84, 221-22, 2172-173), as well as the testimony
of Dr. Stewart

(R. 2342-44, 2354-59, 2376-79, 2382, 3079) and

Andrew (R. 3213-14, 3343-44).

Andrew's challenge to this finding

is simply a failure to acknowledge that he meant what he said in
his pleadings to the court, in his statements to Dr. Stewart, and
his testimony to the trial court on January 10, 1994 (R. 3213-14,
3343-44).
Finding 24 which provides:
The Defendant
on several
occasions
created
scenes
that
were
emotionally
disturbing to the children.
He physically
took the children from the Plaintiff in
January of 1993 when Plaintiff did not agree
to that visitation and attempted to take them
again without her agreement in June, 1993.
Prior to the filing of the divorce, he ran his
bicycle into the family car, then told Will
(untruthfully) , who was in the car driven by
the Plaintiff that the Plaintiff had hurt him
and that he had to go to the hospital. Even
the Defendant's own witnesses testified that
this was totally inappropriate behavior.
is supported by the testimony of Dr. Stewart

(R. 2265-68, 2288,

2324, 3119-20, Exhibit "1"), Dr. Goldsmith (R. 2439-42, 2470-74),
Susan (R. 2523-28, 2827-30), and Dr. Susan Mirow, a witness offered
by Andrew (R. 2805, 2808, 2812).

In his challenge, Andrew fails to

recognize that credibility is one of the factors utilized by the
trial court in making its findings.
Finding 25, which provides:
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The Defendant refused to consider the
problems that Will suffers which have been
diagnosed
by
competent
medical
and
psychological professionals to be Attention
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. The Defendant
insists this does not exist, and went to great
lengths to prove that this did not exist
before the court. This has placed Will in the
position of receiving input from one parent
that there is a problem with which he must
deal, while the other parent denies that it
exists.
The need of a child suffering from
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder is
for stability, predictability, and consistency
in their environment.
The Plaintiff is
capable of providing this environment.
The
Defendant
is not.
The Defendant
has
demonstrated an inability to accept this
diagnosis. From the court's perception, this
is not an issue the court is going to decide,
nor need it decide it in terms of reaching a
factual determination.
It does not decide
whether or not Will suffers from Attention
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder.
What the
court does find, is that the Plaintiff after
consulting
with
appropriate
medical
and
psychological experts, determined that a
problem existed and followed the professional
advice she received in caring for Will.
Instead of working with Plaintiff (the parent
having
temporary
custody)
the
Defendant
actively undermined and opposed the prescribed
treatment thus demonstrating a desire to place
his own wishes ahead of the best interest of
his children even after consulting Dr. Frances
Berger who tentatively confirmed the diagnosis
and tried to counsel the Defendant about his
reaction to this information.
is supported by Dr. Stewart (R. 2270-75, 2318-21, 2323, 3107-08),
the declarations of the trial court which provided guidance to the
parties (R. 2855, 3210), Dr. Goldsmith (R. 2535-47, 2462-64, 246875, 2477-79, 2481-82), Susan (R. 2487-89, 2580-84), Dr. Frances
Berger (R. 2895-2906) , and Andrew (R. 3204-09) .

36

In his challenge to this finding, Andrew offered the
testimony of Dr. Delbert Goates.

However, Dr. Goates testified

that he never saw the children, just the tapes (R. 3262), did not
see the deposition of Dr. Frances Berger (R. 3272) , did not see the
report of Dr. Douglas Goldsmith (R. 3272), that, he himself, has
placed children as young as two on medication (R. 3276), that he
knows

and respects the work of Dr. Frances Berger and would

consider her opinion important regarding a finding of hyperactivity
(R. 3 3 07), that he considers Dr. Douglas Goldsmith knowledgeable
regarding hyperactivity and would consider his opinion important
(R. 33 07) and it is important that Dr. Goldsmith was unwilling to
start treatment because Susan and Andrew disagreed (R. 3310), which
information was not given to him.

(R. 3310) .

In addition, Dr.

Goates was not told that Will had his own therapist.

(R. 3311).

In other words, highly significant information was not given to Dr.
Goates.

Once again Andrew fails to consider that when testimony is

in conflict, it is not an abuse of discretion to choose which
testimony to accept.

Yelderman v. Yelderman, supra, Nilson v.

Nilson, supra.
The trial court made it clear throughout the trial that
a determination of whether or not Will was hyperactive was not the
issue, the issue was whether or not a parent was ignoring or
rejecting competent medical opinions.
Finally, a series of evidentiary rulings are packaged
together by Andrew as asserted in error.
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First, he claims that

Strassberg was not allowed to testify that Dr. Stewart's rejection
of

the

parties'

MMPI

profiles

psychological profession.
had

never

seen

either

were

not

consistent

with

the

As is pointed out infra. Dr. Strassberg
party,

and

therefore

did

not

have

a

foundational basis on which to offer an opinion in this case.
Furthermore, when the trial is to the court,
his rulings on evidence need not be subjected
to quite such critical scrutiny as when it is
to the jury, because in arriving at his
conclusions upon the issues he will include in
his consideration of them his knowledge and
his judgment as to the competing materiality
and effect of evidence.
In Re Baxter's Estate, 399 P.2d 442, 445 (Utah 1965).
Andrew

then asserts

that

his

inability

to answer a

question was the basis of the court's finding against him.

That is

not correct. The findings in support of Andrew's "playing with" as
opposed to "parenting" the children are discussed in regard to
finding 18. The offered testimony was repetitive of his testimony.
The

trial

court

appropriately

refused

evidence regarding the alleged "witness tampering".

to

consider
The court

carefully explained its rulings (R. 3186-3190) pointing out that
Andrew was attempting to introduce evidence on a matter which
should have been considered in either a criminal context or a
contempt context, not in the context of the divorce trial.

The

trial court appropriately exercised its discretion in that ruling
to control the scope of the trial.
In sum, the trial court appropriately carried out its
function of fact finder.

In doing so, it resolved, conflicting
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testimony and evidence.
Nilson, supra.

Yelderman v. Yelderman, supra, Nilson v.

In applying the appropriate standard of review, it

is clear that the challenged findings must be shown to be an abuse
of discretion.

There is no abuse of discretion.

In this case,

Andrew has merely shown that there is testimony conflicts with the
finding of the court.

He has failed to marshall the evidence that

supports the challenged findings. The marshalled evidence reveals
that the trial court appropriately exercised its fact
discretion.

Andrew ignores the issue of credibility.

finding

He fails to

evaluate the factor that all admitted evidence is not of equal
weight. The trial court made detailed findings which fully support
the award of custody to Susan.
followed

and

applied

the

In doing so, the trial court

criteria

as

articulated

by

the

legislature, judicial council, and Appellate courts of this state.
Those findings and the ruling should be affirmed.
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES
In the court below, the mother was awarded attorney's
fees as she was found to be in need of financial assistance for
having to litigate this matter.

When this Court affirms the trial

court, the matter should then be remanded for an award of those
attorney's fees and costs she has incurred on appeal.

Hall v.

Hall, 855 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993).
SUMMARY AND RELIEF SOUGHT
The trial court properly exercised its discretion in
sifting and weighing contrasting and conflicting evidence.

It

entered findings of fact which show a careful, thorough examination
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of the factors it should consider in reaching a decision in a
contested custody case. Andrew challenges those findings but fails
to

marshall

challenge.

the

evidence

supporting

them

in

presenting

his

The sufficiency of the findings is not challenged.

Susan seeks a ruling from this Court affirming the trial
court's award of custody to her and an award of the costs and
attorney's fees she has incurred in defending this appeal.
DATED this

7

day of May, 1995.
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